Central Washington University

ScholarWorks@CWU
All Master's Theses

Master's Theses

1967

Conservatism in a Bayesian Probability Situation as a Function of
the Sex of the Subject
Paul Frederick Miller
Central Washington University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.cwu.edu/etd
Part of the Applied Behavior Analysis Commons, and the Biological Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Miller, Paul Frederick, "Conservatism in a Bayesian Probability Situation as a Function of the Sex of the
Subject" (1967). All Master's Theses. 723.
https://digitalcommons.cwu.edu/etd/723

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Master's Theses at ScholarWorks@CWU. It has been
accepted for inclusion in All Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@CWU. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@cwu.edu.

CONSERVATISM IN A BAYESIAN PROBABILITY SITUATION
AS A FUNCTION OF THE SEX OF THE SUBJECT

A Thesis
Presented to
the Graduate Faculty
Central Washington State College

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science

by

Paul Fredrick Miller
August 1967

LD
5771.3

~~-~1r
J, ~ '' ~1. ~,
•J

APPROVED FOR THE GRADUATE FACULTY

________________________________
Eldon E. Jacobsen, COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN
_________________________________
Roger Stewart
_________________________________
Richard B. Morris

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Many people were instrumental in the designing,
running, and reporting of this experiment.

The efforts

of Dr. Eldon Jacobsen with respect to the final presentation of this material was very helpful.

The efforts of

Mr. Richard Morris on the statistical analysis of the
data were both helpful and necessary for accurate computation and meaningful presentation of the results.

I

also wish to express my appreciation to Dr. Lillian Lauer
who served as a committee member until leaving in June.
Her efforts and those of Dr. Roger Stewart, who agreed a
week before oral examinations to sit on the committee,
are represented in this paper.
I would also like to express my gratitude to
Mr. Jerry Shulenbarger for his suggestions and the hours
he voluntarily spent in aiding me with the statistical
analysis.
Also, I wish to thank Mr. Richard Giroux for his
suggestions pertaining to the design of the experiment
and for acting as an assistant during the testing session.
Lastly, I want to extend my sincere thanks to my
wife, Carol; through her own personal efforts and sacrifices she provided me with the opportunity to conduct
this project.

For this, I am most grateful.

ABSTRACT
The present study was designed to examine whether
the conservatism present in a Bayesian probability situation could be partially attributable to the sex of the
subjects performing the task.

The experimental design

required that the subjects estimate the probabilities of
occurrence of two independent events.

They were then given

an opportunity to revise their estimates as additional
information was experimentally introduced into the situation.
These estimates were compared to estimates calculated from
Bayes• theorem.
The results of this experiment failed to support
the hypothesis that the female subjects would exhibit more
conservatism than the male subjects.
Suggested explanations for these results centered
around the nature of the task performed and the characteristics of the experimental situation.
Suggestions for further research were both
theoretical and methodological in nature.
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Problem
The purpose of the present study is to examine the
phenomena of "conservatism" in probabilistic inference situations. Specifically, this study will investigate whether
the amount of "conservatism" present in this type of situation differs according to the sex of the subject performing
the task.

The normative model to be used is Bayes' theorem.

This model prescribes how people should behave in a situation
which requires them to estimate the probability of occurrence
of specific events.

11

Conservatism 11 will be defined as

failure of the subjects to perform in a manner consistent
with this model.
The importance of probability theory in statistics
originally centered around the development of a "statistical
method."

The necessity for this type of method resulted

from an increased interest in statistics during the middle
part of the nineteenth century and consisted primarily of
two aspects.

The first aspect of this method was the

development of a statistical method of investigation.
Secondly, was the need for a statistical method of inference.
The statistical method of "investigation" consisted
primarily of investigating a phenomena and measuring it by
various sorts of averages.

The emphasis was upon studying

variability instead of eliminating it.

2

The second aspect of the statistical method, inference, was concerned with the relationship between theory
and observation; theory suggesting what to observe and
observation correcting theory.

It was shown, however, that

an interplay between observation and theory was needed which
would make observations more relevant and meaningful with
respect to particular theories.

The development of proba-

bility theory was a natural consequence of this dilemma.
Employing the characteristics of this theory, the scientist
could make "mathematical guesses" with respect to observations made in the long run.
Probability theory was extended in the work of R. A.
Fisher during the 1920 1 s and culminated in the work of
Neyman and Pearson during the 1930 1 s.

Through the careful

development of appropriate inferential concepts and procedures, a stability or orthodoxy in the theory and practice
of probability had developed by 1940.

This orthodoxy is

presently referred to as the classical interpretation of
probability.
One of the primary constructs of the classical interpretation is that of relative frequency.

Basically, this

principle states that "For equally likely elementary events,
the probability of an event A is its relative frequency in
the sample space" (Hayes, 1963, p. 56).

Fisher and Neyman

both insisted that "all probabilities referred to should
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have a basis or interpretation in terms of frequencies"
(Anscombe, 1964, p. 160).

The probability of the data,

therefore, denotes nothing other than its relative frequency
to be expected in the long run.

The primary purpose of

statistical analysis is to summarize the data, collected by
a scientist, relative to a particular phenomena, without
considering how the particular method of analysis used might
influence the beliefs and actions of the person employing
them.
One problem with the "frequentist 1 s" position is that
it offers no direct theory of inference or of scientific
procedure.

It is concerned with how to make data meaning-

ful, not how to meaningfully collect data.
A second problem with this position is related to the
rules that should be used in relating mathematical properties
to observations in the real world.

Frequencies are not

actual probabilities but only estimates of probabilities.
The scientist is forced to work within the confines of
finite occurrences; therefore, uncertainties are always
present.

These uncertainties cannot adequately be explained

or described simply by means of probabilities.
Much of the criticism directed against the classical
school has been a result of the development of statistical
decision theory.

The importance of this development centered

around the work of A. Wald and L. J. Savage.

Wald 1 s efforts
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were primarily directed towards the scientist who was considered to be a rational decision maker.

The work of

Savage was prominent in the rehabilitation of subjective
probability and utility.
The concept of utility was originally introduced by
Danial Bernoulli (1738).

He insisted that the value of an

object could not be determined by its price but was rather
a function of the utility it yielded.

Values are therefore

relative to the people assigning them.and are inversely
related to the quantity of the object the person already
possesses.

Thus, they are not constant for all people but

vary depending upon the particular situation.
Recently the importance of this concept has been
realized by psychologists.

Miller (1964) has pointed out

that there is a definite need for the development of a
theory of normative application.

This theory must be dis-

tinguished from descriptive theory and is primarily derived
from logic instead of observation.

Deductive logic tells

us how we ought to think or behave, not how we do behave.
The logician therefore specifies how people ought to think,
not what they ought to think.

Since utility is relative to

the person assigning value to an object, there is a need
for a normative model of utility.
One of the leading proponents of this idea has been
a "school" which views men as probabilistic information
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processors.

This movement, known as Bayesian statistics,

operates from the principle that "probability is orderly
opinion, and that inference from data is nothing other than
the revision of such opinion in the light of relevant new
information" (Edwards, Lindman, and Savage, 1963).

Bayes•

theorem is said to be the appropriate normative model for
decision making situations.

It prescribes how a person

should behave if he is to be consistent with himself.
pointed out by Anscombe (1964, p. 161),

11

As

It is a theory of

consistency of the person's body of beliefs or preferences;
there is no consideration of ethics."

His observed behav-

iors are characteristic of description only.
The major contribution of the Bayesian movement has
been the concept of "personal probability."
bilities are

n •••

Personal proba-

ideally consistent opinions, and con-

form to the axioms of probability theory • • • 11 (Peterson,
Schneider & Miller, 1965).

These probabilities are to be

distinguished from "subjective probabilities" which are
defined as

11

. . .

a weight attached to an event by an

individual that indicates the strength of his expectation
that the event will occur" (Stilson, 1966, p. 79).

Subjec-

tive probabilities may also be interpreted as the value
that the occurrence of an event has for the individual; it
is the utility of the event with respect to the person.

6

In order for personal probabilities to be both consistent and orderly opinion, it is necessary that they obey
the axioms of probability theory.

No such restriction is

placed on subjective probabilities.

The two primary axioms

that personal probabilities must conform to are:
0

~

p(A)

~

(1)

p(S) = 1.00

(2)

p(AUB) : p(A) + p(B)

where Sis the universal event; A and Bare any two incompatible or nonintersecting events; and AUB is the event
that A or B or both A and Bare true.
Personal probabilities exist prior to the actual
occurrence of an event.

In an experimental situation, per-

sonal probabilities may reflect the degree of confidence
the experimenter has with respect to his hypothesis.

The

Bayesian statistician insists that such probabilities are
present prior to the collection of data.

This is due to

the fact that experimenters are usually not naive to the
particular problem they are studying.

Background literature

and their own professional skills are available to them.
Thus their opinions are different from the subjective
opinions made by people in everyday situations.

The insis-

tence of these prior probabilities is the primary distinguishing feature
classical school.

between the Bayesian movement and the
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One difficulty entailed in the use of subjective
probabilities is that persons who are equally familiar with
the situation may disagree on the probability that should
be assigned to a given event.

These results could be

expected, however, if it is kept in mind that subjective
probabilities involve more than the attitude of the person
towards the event; they are also reflective of the gamble
or risk he is willing to take with respect to the occurrence
or non-occurrence of the event.

This addition of "personal"

into probability theory is a second contribution of the
Bayesian movement.
One problem raised with respect to Bayes• theorem as
a normative model is that when subjective and objective
probabilities are combined, the assumption must be made
that subjective probabilities combine according to the same
rules of mathematical probability theory as the objective
probabilities do.

Savage (1962) has demonstrated that

" • • • subjective probabilities have the same mathematical
properties as objective probabilities; but there the resemblance ends."

Upon examination of the degree to which sub-

jective probability judgments conform to the Bayesian model,
the present study assumes that subjective probabilities do
obey the mathematical rules of probability theory.

Two

requirements for the application of Bayes• theorem and the
rules this study assumes subjective probabilities obey are:
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(1) The sum of all outcome probabilities in a given sample
space must be unity; and (2) The sum of the probabilities
of the outcomes combined in an event equals the probability
of that event.
Bayes• theorem is contingent upon conditional probability theory.

Simply stated, if an event A has a proba-

bility of occurrence assigned to it, p(A), and if the scientist assigning this probability is given some additional
information relevant to A, such as the occurrence of event
B, then knowledge of the occurrence of B must be considered
when estimating p(A).

The proper formula is:

p(AIB) = p(A /lB)
p(B)

(3)

where p(AIB) is the posterior probability of A given that B
has occurred; the p(AnB) is the probability of A and B
occurring jointly; and the p(B) is the prior probability of
B occurring.
Simple algebraic transformation of equation 3 results
in the basic form of Bayes• theorem:
p(AIB) = p(BIAjp(A)

(4)

p(B

where A is any hypothesis; the Bis the data; the p(A) is the
prior probability of the hypothesis under consideration
being correct; the p(BfA) is the probability of the data
being associated with the hypothesis; the p(B) is the prior
probability of the data occurring; and the p(AJB) is the
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posterior probability that the hypothesis is correct, given
the data associated with it.
The most widely used and appropriate technique for
examining how people function as probabilistic information
processors is to introduce them into an experimental situation in which they are required to choose between alternative
events.

By submitting relevant information into the situa-

tion, the amount of subjective revision can be compared to
the normative model.

Failure of subjects to behave in a

manner consistent with this model is what has been defined
as conservatism.
The most consistent result of this type of experiment
has been the presence of the conservative effect (Phillips,
Hays, and Edwards, 1965).

These investigators asked sub-

jects to decide whether detected aerial activity was indicative of enemy attack, friendly activity, meteor shower, or
an enemy attempt to "spoof" the surveillance system.

After

recording their decision, the subjects were given additional
information about more aerial activity.

They were then asked

to record another estimate with respect to the four events
under consideration.

This procedure was followed for

thirty-two presentations of information.

The results of

their study demonstrated the small amount of subjective
revision made by the subjects when Bayesian probabilities
showed considerable change.
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These findings indicate that human beings are fallible
when it comes to processing information; that the

1

average 1

person is not able to utilize all the information available
to him.

Also these findings indicate that subjects are not

consistent in their use of the information they are processing.
Peterson and Miller (1965) attempted to compensate for
the conservative effect by manipulating both the prior odds
in favor of a hypothesis and the theoretical impact of the
datum.

A large number of dice, distinguished by different

numbers of black versus white sides, were placed in an urn
in varying proportions.

For each trial the die with the

greater number of black sides was termed Ha and the die with
the greater number of white sides was termed Hb.

The experi-

menter drew a single die from the urn and asked the subject
to set prior probability estimates for Ha and Hb.

He then

rolled the die from a cup and informed the subject which
side turned up.

On the basis of this information the sub-

ject revised his estimates about which die had been rolled.
The theoretical impact of the data was manipulated by
drawing either Ha or Hb from the urn.

The prior probability

of the hypothesis was manipulated by varying the proportion
of white sides to black sides in the urn.

These investiga-

tors failed to reduce the conservative effect; in fact, as
the difference between Bayesian prior and posterior
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probabilities increased, conservatism increased.
Schum (1966) presented to subjects six classes of
data describing the characteristics of a military deployment.

The subjects were required to decide whether this

information represented war, a forthcoming attack, or
simply a maneuver.

Conditional non-independency of data

was controlled by the prior selection of the particular
information to be presented.

It was found that the use of

non-independent data failed to reduce the amount of conservatism present.
In a series of three experiments, Phillips and
Edwards (1966) examined the effect of the diagnostic value
of the data, payoffs, and response modes on conservatism.
In the first experiment the diagnostic value of the data
was reflected by the likelihood ratio, a ratio describing
the occurrence of the data dependent upon the separate
probabilities of the two hypotheses under consideration,
as a function of the numerical difference between the cues
sampled.

The subjects were told to imagine ten paper bags,

each bag containing one hundred poker chips with red chips
prodominant in r bags and blue chips prodominant in 10-r
bags.

They were then shown one bag and told that it had

randomly been drawn from the ten.

After being asked to

estimate whether an r or 10-r bag had been chosen, the
experimenter explained that with no other information given,
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the best estimates that could be made were r/10 and 10-r/10.
If the subjects estimates differed from the suggested estimates, they were asked to change them.

All subjects, there-

fore, started with the same probability estimates.

The

experimenter then drew twenty chips from the bag and displayed them, one at a time, to the subjects.

After each

chip was displayed, the subjects were asked to revise their
previous estimates.

This procedure was repeated twenty-four

times.
Results of this experiment indicated that as data
became more diagnostic (likelihood ratio approached one),
subjects became more Bayesian, however conservatism was
present for all the subjects.
In the second experiment the effect of motivation on
conservatism was investigated.

The design and procedure

for this experiment was basically the same as the first
experiment.

The three primary differences between them

were that the proportion of chips in each bag was a constant
70-30; all the sequences in experiment II started with
probabilities of 50-50; and only twenty sequences were
presented.
Three experimental groups and one control group were
used for their second experiment.

Experimental Group I

received payoffs that were logarithmically related to their
subjective estimates; Experimental Group II received payoffs
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quadratically related to their estimates; Experimental
Group III received payoffs linearally related to their
estimates; and the Control Group received no payoffs.
Following each sequence of twenty draws of chips,
the subjects were told which hypothesis was correct.

Each

subject then spun a spinner which selected one of his
twenty pairs of estimates.

His estimate for the correct

hypothesis on the chosen pair determined the amount of payoff.

The subjects were aware throughout the experiment of

the number of
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pointsn they were accumulating.

Following

the experiment their points were converted into money.
The results of this experiment showed that payoffs
had a positive effect on the amount of conservatism present.
Experimental Group III (linear payoffs) exhibited less conservatism than the other three groups.

The authors con-

cluded that in probabilistic inference situations where
small between subject variance is desired, payoffs should
be used.
Experiment III was conducted to test the effect that
the method of recording estimates had on conservatism.

The

design and procedure were basically the same as the first
experiment.

Four different methods of recording estimates

were tested.

Group I recorded their estimates by placing

metal washers in two vertical troughs (discrete method).
Group II verbalized their estimates while an experimenter
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recorded them.

Groups III and IV were called the logarith-

mic continuous groups.

Group III recorded estimates by

setting a sliding pointer on a scale of odds spaced logarithmically.

Group IV recorded their estimates on a scale

where the size of the intervals was determined by converting
the probabilities to odds and scaling the odds.

None of

the groups were told which hypothesis was correct and no
payoffs were received.
Results of this experiment indicate that the method
of recording estimates does not eliminate conservatism.
The estimates for the verbal and logarithmic odds groups
were less conservative than Group I; however, all subjects
consistently failed to significantly approach the normative
model.
As a result of these three experiments, Phillips and
Edwards concluded that the failure of subjects to extract
from the data all the certainty that is experimentally
available is consistent and orderly and may reflect a general
limitation on human ability to process information.
Due to the amount of experimental manipulation employed
in these three experiments, the present investigater is
hesitant to accept them as sufficient evidence for the above
conclusion.

It is possible that conservatism was encouraged

in these experiments and that in the absence of the different
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manipulatory techniques the amount of conservatism present
would have been of a smaller magnitude.
Motivation in a probabilistic inference situation
may be influenced by variables other than payoffs.

A large

quantity of information may be overwhelming enough to prevent optimal performance by the subjects.

Likewise, small

quantities of information may be ineffective as motivators
thus resulting in conservative behavior.
This problem was investigated by Peterson, Schneider,
and Miller (1965).

In an experiment involving the drawing

of black and white marbles from one of two beakers, the
effect of sample size, quantity of information presented,
was investigated.

For Group I the marbles were drawn one

at a time; for Group II they were drawn four at a time;
for Group III they were drawn twelve at a time; and for
Group IV they were drawn forty-eight at a time.

Following

each draw the subjects were required to estimate which
beaker was being used.

They were subsequently told which

hypothesis was correct after a total of forty-eight marbles
had been drawn.
Employing this design results in only three of the
groups making probability revisions.

Group IV received all

forty-eight marbles in one draw; therefore, revision was
not required.

Since Bayes' theorem is the normative model

for estimate revision, it is questionable whether the
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results of this group can be analyzed with respect to it.
The results of this study indicate that sample size
influences the conservative effect.

The larger the sample

size the more was the amount of revision; however, it
occurred at the expense of revision accuracy, or increased
conservatism.

Size of the sample and revision accuracy

were therefore found to be inversely related.

These authors

concluded that subjects are able to work with only a limited
amount of information if they are to maintain revision
accuracy.
Kogan and Wallach (1964) administered a five-hour
battery of tests to 114 male subjects and 103 female subjects to investigate the various aspects of decision making
and risk taking.

The primary purpose of this research was

" • • • an attempt to look at human thinking and problem
solving from the point of view of the risks, potential
costs, and potential gains that may face the individual as
he proceeds in his efforts" (Kogan, et al., p. 1).

Decision

making involves alternatives and the avoidance or acceptance
of various alternatives are likely to be important ingredients in the thinking process.

The results of this study

are to be accepted as descriptive and not explanatory of
decision making processes; statements of explanation await
future research.
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The tests administered in the Kogan and Wallach
study primarily involved measures of extremeness of judgment, extremeness of self rating, the personality factors
of anxiety and defensiveness, and various measures of decision making strategies.
The findings of this research are relevant to the
present paper for four reasons:

(1) Probabilistic infer-

ence situations require decision making on the part of the
subjects; (2) This type of situation also requires the processing of additional information and the opportunity for
subjective estimate revision; (3) Subjective estimates are
reflective of the motivational aspects operative in the
situation; (4) The present study also involves a situation
in which the subjects have no control over the problem
outcome.

Of particular importance to the present paper are

the results which report differences found between the male
and female subjects.

Since the effect of sex as a modera-

tor variable in decision making situations has received
little attention in the past, Kogan and Wallach reported
their results separately by sex throughout their paper.
In general, it was found that males exhibited greater
confidence of judgment than females.

This was evidenced by

the fact that they were more sensitive with respect to when
certain strategies ceased to payoff or be effective.

The

male subjects appeared more alert to the subtle distinctions
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between their specific task requirements and as a result
adopted more risky but less extreme strategies than the
female subjects.

These results were especially evident in

situations where the subjects had no personal control over
the problem outcomes.
These investigators concluded that behavior in
decision making situations is attributable primarily to
failure-avoidance in females and image-maintenance in males.
Also, manifest anxiety is related to conservatism of strategy
preferences in males only, while rigidity yields a much more
pervasive pattern of relationships with conservatism in
females.

In females, therefore, it was found that there was

a direct relation between impulsiveness and risk taking under
these hypothetical conditions.
The present study is concerned with whether the above
described results are operative in an experimental situation
employing two specific experimental conditions.

The first

condition is that subjects be required to choose between two
specific alternative events and that by introducing additional
information they be given the opportunity to revise their
subjective estimates or opinions.

The second condition is

that the subjects have no control over the outcome of the
problem.
The hypotheses of the present investigation are
therefore twofold.

First, it will be shown that conservatism
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is present when comparing the performance of human subjects
to Bayes• theorem in this type of situation; secondly, it
will be demonstrated that female subjects exhibit more
conservatism than male subjects.
Method
Subjects
Forty-three volunteer students, 28 females and 15
males, from Psychology of Adjustment classes at Central
Washington State College served as Ss.
Apparatus
The stimulus cues consisted of 1000 cardboard squares
(l"xl") and 1000 cardboard right triangles (l"xl"xl.4").
These cues were distributed in two wooden boxes {8"x8"x8 11 )
in the proportion of 600 squares and 400 triangles in one
box, Rs, and 600 triangles and 400 squares in the other box,
Ht.

Large numbers of figures were used so that, with con-

tinual mixing, sampling without replacement could be considered a reasonable approximation of sampling with replacement.
Both boxes were painted with red enamel paint and had
a yellow square or triangle painted on one side of them.
The particular figure represented that the highest frequency
of this geometric figure was contained in this box.

Other

apparatus consisted of standard overhead projector (see
reference); a standard Radiant Wall movie screen; one
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Wollensak tape recorder, Model T-1616 Electronic Control;
one reel of Scotch Magnetic Tape, Tartan Series 141; two
transparencies, one divided into 18 rectangles (Appendix A),
and the other with an example of the Ss recording sheets
drawn on it (Appendix B); a standard classroom table; two
pair of eyebrow tweezers; a black wooden barrier (33 11 xl2 11 x
15 11 ); and Ss response sheets for each trial (Appendix C).
Procedure
The experimental design required the presentation of
certain information and an evaluation of the effect upon
revision of subjective probabilities as a result of this
information.

The two boxes with varying proportions of

squares and triangles were the alternative events (hypotheses)
available to the subjects (Ss).

Each trial consisted of the

random selection of 36 cues from one of the boxes.

After

each trial, the Ss were shown from which box the cues had
been drawn.
Two assistants aided the experimenter (E) in conducting the experiment.

One of the assistants, voluntarily

chosen from among the Ss, was responsible for drawing the
sample of stimulus cues from the box.

This assistant was

chosen in this manner to eliminate experimenter bias.

The

second assistant, pre-arranged by E, recorded the stimulus
cues as they were drawn from the box.

This information was

necessary for computation of Bayesian probabilities.
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There was a total of ten trials.

Each trial con-

sisted of drawing 18 pairs of stimulus cues from one of the
two boxes.

Following each draw of a pair of cues, the Ss

were required to make two estimates.

Their first estimate

was with respect to Rs being the correct hypothesis.

Their

second estimate was with respect to Ht being correct.

To

insure that their subjective estimates obeyed the same
mathematical rules as Bayesian probabilities, the Ss were
told that their estimates for Rs and Ht on any one draw
must sum to unity.
The experiment began by Ss receiving taped instructions (Appendix D) as to what was meant by probability
estimates, the nature of the experimental procedure, and
the nature of their specific task.
the instructions.

Each Shad a copy of

Since the instructions themselves could

encourage conservatism, it was important that they were
neither directive nor suggestive as to what estimates should
be made.

A pilot study of 27 Ss was run to insure that the

instructions were completely clear as to the nature of the
experimental situation.
Trial 1 began by E flipping a coin to determine which
box would be used.

The boxes had been placed behind a

wooden barrier which was located on a table situated between
the Ss and the projector.

After determining which box

would be used, E removed this box from behind the barrier
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and handed it to the subject assistant seated next to the
projector.

Since the box was visible to the Ss as it was

handed to the assistant, it was necessary to conceal the
geometric figure from their vision.

After handing the box

to the assistant, E sat on the opposite side of the
projector.
With a pair of tweezers in each hand, the assistant
randomly drew a pair of figures out of the box.

These cues

were handed to E who placed them on the first square of the
transparency on the projector.

This method of displaying

the cues was decided on so that each S could clearly see
which cues had been drawn.

The cue in the assistant's

right hand was placed on the right side of the square.

All

triangle cues faced the same direction.
Following this drawing of the first pair of cues,
the Ss were required to make probability estimates with
respect to Hs and Ht.

These estimates were recorded on

provided record sheets.

After a period of five seconds,

the subject assistant drew a second pair of cues from the
box.

These cues were displayed by E in the second square

of the transparency.
two more estimates.

The Ss were then required to make
This procedure continued until 36 cues

(18 pairs) had been drawn from the box.
After the drawing of the last pair of cues, E picked
up the box and placed it in front of the barrier with the

23
geometric figure exposed to the Ss.
box behind the barrier.

Ethen returned the

Following this the boxes were

shuffled by E to prevent the Ss detection of the correct
box by placement.

Ethen flipped a coin to determine which

box would be used for trial 2.

All ten trials followed

this same procedure.
Since the estimates made by the Ss offered no information with respect to the particular approach to the problem adopted by them, the Ss were asked to fill out a questionnaire following the testing session (Appendix E).

This

questionnaire primarily investigated their attitude towards
the task and the particular approach they used to determine
whether Hs or Ht was the correct hypothesis.
Peterson, Schneider, and Miller (1965) have demonstrated that Ss are able to process only limited amounts of
information if they are to attain revision accuracy.

To

maintain accuracy in the present study, the cues were
sampled in pairs.

The total number of cues drawn, 36, was

decided upon as a result of the functional area of the overhead projector.

Using this procedure, Ss made a total of

180 estimates.
Results
The present experiment required the Ss to make subjective estimates about the occurrence of two independent

events.

These estimates were then compared, at the end of
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each trial, to estimates derived from Bayes' theorem.

The

appropriate statistic for making this comparison was the
accuracy ratio.

This ratio is a comparison between the sub-

jective odds in favor of Hs and the corresponding Bayesian
odds in favor of the same hypothesis.
Relation of Odds to Probabilities
The odds ~

0

(Hs) are related to the probability of Hs

by the following equation:
-R,o (Hs) 1.00-p(Hs)
Simply stated:

= p(Hs)

(5)

if the probability of an event Hs is equal

to p(Hs), the odds in favor of the event are p(Hs) to 1.00-p(Hs)•
Therefore odds and probability are related to each other as
follows:
( 6)

Part of hypothesis testing in the Bayesian system is finding
the posterior probability of Hs, (HslD), or equivalently,
finding the posterior odds -R-.i.(Hs lD) in favor of Hs·
Measure of Estimate Revision
Bayes• theorem is a consequence of conditional probability theory and is therefore appropriate for calculating
the probability of Hypothesis Has a result of information
provided by the occurrence of Datum D.

The basic form of

Bayes• theorem presented in the introduction of this paper
was:
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p(HID) =

p(D/H))(H)
p(D

( 4)

where p(HjD) is equal to the posterior probability of H;
p(DIH) is the probability of the data given that H has
occurred; p(H) is the prior probability of H; and p(D) is
the prior probability of Datum D.

An equation for two

hypotheses which was relevant to this paper was obtained
by dividing Equation 4 for Hs by Equation 4 for Ht:

(7)
where p(Hs)D)/p(HtlD) is a ratio describing the posterior
odds of Hs to Ht as a result of a single Datum D; the
p(D/Hs)/p(D!Ht) is a ratio describing the likelihood of D
dependent upon the odds of Hs to Ht; and the p(Hs)/p(Ht) is
a ratio describing the prior odds of Hs to Ht·

Equation 5

may be written more simply as:

..f?,=
where

.f2 1

L

.5?-o

(8)

are the posterior odds in favor of Hs; L is the

likelihood ratio; and~0 are the prior odds in favor of Hs·
From equation 6 it can be seen that the posterior odds are
equal to the product of the likelihood ratio and the prior
odds in favor of Hs·

Since the prior odds of the present

experiment were equal to 1:1 at the beginning of each trial,
the posterior odds were equal to the likelihood ratio.
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Likelihood Ratio
The likelihood ratio specifies the likelihood of the
particular datum occurring and is defined as "the probability of the datum on one hypothesis divided by its probability on the other hypothesis" (Edwards, Lindman, & Phillips,

1965, p. 302).

The likelihood ratio is therefore an odds

ratio and was calculated in favor of Hs for the present
experiment.
Calculation of Likelihood Ratios
Likelihood ratios for both the subjective estimates
(SLLR) and the Bayesian estimates (BLLR) were calculated.
The SLLRs were calculated by converting the posterior probability estimates of the subjects into posterior odds in
favor of Hs•

These odds were then transformed into Log

posterior odds.

Conversion of subjective estimates into

Log odds necessitated that the most extreme estimates of
certainty acceptable in this experiment be 99 and 1.
The BLLRs for the present experiment were calculated
as suggested by Edwards, et. al. (1965, p. 300).

Briefly,

if the probability of drawing a square from the box is E.
and the probability of drawing a triangle is q, then the
probability of drawing any particular sample is prqn-r,
where r is equal to the actual number of squares drawn and
n-r is equal to the actual number of triangles drawn.
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The BLLRs for the present study are the oddslikelihood ratio form of Bayes• theorem.

They are the

ratios depicting the probability of the datum given the box
being used containing 600 squares divided by the probability
of the same datum given that the correct box contains 600
triangles.

These BLLRs were calculated as follows:
(p/q)r -(n-r)

(9)

These BLLRs were transformed into Log posterior odds.

They

were therefore equal to .17609 times the difference between
the number of squares and triangles sampled on each trial.
A BLLR was indeterminate on any trial with equal cue sampling.

The BLLRs and corresponding probabilities for the

present experiment are presented in Tabler.
On Trial 9 of this study the number of squares and
triangles sampled was equal.

To maintain between subject

variance of Ss on this trial, the accuracy ratio used to
depict the Ss performance was the mean accuracy ratio for
each Son the other 9 trials.

This procedure was preferred

to computing a grand mean accuracy ratio so that the data
would continue to represent individual performance.

The

degrees of freedom for the appropriate error term were
reduced by 30.
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TABLE 1
Bayesian Likelihood Ratios and Corresponding
Probabilities Per Trial

BLLR

p(Hs)

1

2.465

.996

2

1.760

.982

3

1.408

.962

4

• 352

• 692

5

.704

.834

6

1.056

.919

7

2.113

.992

8

1.056

.919

9

*

• 600

10

.352

• 692

Trial

*A BLLR for trial 9 was indeterminate.
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Relation of SLLR to BLLR
The dependent variable relating the SLLRs to the
BLLRs in the present experiment was the accuracy ratio.
This ratio has been defined by Peterson and Miller (1965)
as:
SLLR

(10)

BLLR

If the Ss 1 estimates were revised with the same magnitude
as the Bayesian estimates, the accuracy ratio was equal to
1.00.

An accuracy ratio of less than 1.00 was accepted as

evidence of conservatism.
The accuracy ratios and standard deviations per trial
are presented in Table 2.

These results support the first

hypothesis of this experiment.

Figure 1 offers further evi-

dence that conservatism was present in this situation.

From

this figure it can be seen that Ss most nearly approximated
the Bayesian estimates on trials 4, 9, and 10.

Examination

of Table 3 shows that on trials 4 and 10 the frequency with
which the cues were sampled from the box was 19 squares and
17 triangles while on trial 9 this ratio was 50:50.

Since

the Bayesian estimates were calculated in favor of Hs with
respect to Datum D, these estimates would be lower on those
trials which most nearly approximated equal sampling of cues.
The fact that Ss 1 estimates on these trials were less conservative than their estimates on the remaining seven trials
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Table 2
Mean Accuracy Ratio and Standard Deviation
Per Trial

*

n = 43

Trial

SLLR
BLlR

SD

1

.242

.243

2

.123

.112

3

.107

.138

4

• 534

2.557

5

.392

1.670

6

.259

1.241

7

.295

1.382

8

.212

1.114

9

• 682

1.080

10

• 696

3.489

An accuracy ratio deviation from 1.00 indicates
conservatism

SLLR
,.

"

~

= 1.00

--

BLLR
11-- -

- ~- -

-,

Observed ratios

1.10

1.00
tO
0
·rl

...,
('j

.90
.80

,---

H
>,
0

al

~

;:j

0

•

r

V

I

.60

I

~

0
•rl

...,

.50

I
I

E-t

----~

"'-

/

Q

..c:

I

I

.4o

~

0
V

I

A,

0

<

__,

I

.30
'--...

.20
.10

-- .._

-~

I

I

'~

I
V

-

~

I

- ......

I
......._

I

......._
'-I

I

I

.00

1

Figure 1

~

2

3

4

5
Trials
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7

9
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comparison between the mean observed accuracy ratios per trial and a theoritical

accuracy of ratio of l.OO(n=43).

Deviation from 1.00 indicates conservatism.
vJ
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Table 3
Frequency of Stimulus Cues and Correct
Hypothesis Per Trial

Trial

Squares

Triangles

Correct Hypo.

1

25

11

Hs

2

23

13

Ht

3

22

14

Ht

4

19

17

Hs

5

20

16

Hs

6

21

15

Ht

7

24

12

Hs

8

21

15

Ht

9

18

18

Hs

10

19

17

Ht
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suggests that they were operating or processing the information available.

However, it is also possible that the §_s

were continuing to function as consistently imperfect information processors.

The higher

accuracy ratios on trials 4,

9, and 10 may be only a matter of circumstance with respect
to the lower BLLRs.

No data is available to show which of

the two above possibilities were operative on these trials.
To perform the analysis of variance to examine the

differences in conservatism due to the particular sex of
the subjects, the 28 female §_s were randomly divided into
two groups of n=l3 and n=15.

Due to the specific nature of

the experimental situat1cn, random division of the female
Ss was preferred to introducing 13 more male §_s to the task.

Since a second group of males would have to be exposed to
the same cue situation as the original group, this section
would fail to meet the standards of randomization required
for this experiment.

A

non-significant t-value of

t•.019(df•26) between the differences of the two female
groups allowed analysis

or

variance to be performed on the

subsample of 15 females.
A

Table 4.

summary

or

the analysis of variance appears 1n

The difference in the amount of conservatism due

to the .§_s sex was not significant.
that the amount

or

This analysis suggests

conservatism displayed by the female §.;a

with respect to Hs was of the same general magnitude as
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that displayed by the male Ss.

Examination of the accuracy

ratios for the female Ss and the male Ss on each trial
support this analysis.

These accuracy ratios are presented

in Tables 5 and 6 respectively.
The trials effect of Table 4 reached significance
beyond the p<.001 level.

These results offer evidence

that as the trials progressed both groups of Ss acquired
some

11

skill 11 in their use of the cue information.

However,

it must be kept in mind that the possibility advanced earlier,
that the Ss 1 estimates remained consistently imperfect but
were less conservative towards the end of the experiment
because the Bayesian estimates were lower on these later
trials, is still tenable.
From the non-significant AB interaction of Table 4,
it may be concluded that the female Ss adjusted to the
situation with relatively the same magnitude as the Male Ss.
Examinations of Tables 5 and 6 support this conclusion.
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Table 4
Analysis of Variance Summary Table
n = 30

Source

ms

F

1

.534

1.425

10.293

28

.367

Within Subjects

67.280

270

B (trials)

9.239

9

1.026

4.055**

AB ( sex over trials)

2.091

.232

.917

Bx Ss within Groups

56.250

9
222

Between Subjects
A (sex)
Subjects within Groups

** p < .001

ss

df

10.816

29

.523

.253

Table 5
Observed Accuracy Ratios for n=l5 Female Subjects
TRIALS

1

2

3

4

5

1

.341

.177

.058

.444

.197

2

.019

.052

.058

.444

3

.003

.560

.039

4

.341

• _,_ (

777
I

.117

5

.341

• lj6

.039

Subject

6

.341

.117

.3,~9

6

7

8

9

10

.0001

.077

.869

.733

4.440

.296

.107

.on

.107

.181

.542

.749

.012

.869

.077

.351

.378

.749

.444

.592

"Z.C::l
._,,,,./
.....

.770

..., '
._,,,._,_

.,-,

.398

e

• U;.l~

1.973

•

8?-o
\.} ,.I

.770

•J.,)-'--

----·--··

2·:::-'"'!

c:::.e;Q,

• _,I,/

'v

41,1,
r..,..

.444

..

4. 1r1+0

1.970

.860

.7?0

.CC'Ol

.995

.0001

~!~4

.197

.132

.077

.132

.176

.444

~~------

7

.001

.001

.156

8

.341

.l

.ff"-C
_,

,/

.012

.0001

.028

.770

.021

.260

.963

9

.341

.177

.156

.562

.197

.132

.069

.123

.310

1.030

10

.341

.o4o

.090

.444

.296

.263

.023

.869

.312

.444

11

.003

.177

.090

.444

.241

.204

.069

.3c:;1_,_

.224

.444

12

.341

.o4o

.156

.249

.021

.204

.030

.132·

.132

.018

13

.341

.0001

.0001

.0001

.0001

.869

.770

.869

.316

.0001

14

.013

.177

.090

.015

.197

.132

.011

.132

.134

.444

15

.341

.156

.039

.562

.790

.869

.770

.869

.981

4.440

1J

t.v
0\

Table 6
Observed Accuracy Ratios for n=15 Male Subjects

TRIALS

Subject

-·

--

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1

.341

.017

.058

.667

,296

.263

.o43

.520

.194

.015

2

.341

.177

.039

.0001

.197

.087

.770

.052

.184

.0001

3

.341

.177

.741

.444

.241

.137

.077

.132

.303

.444

4

.177

, r=C.

•l..,).,j_

•..L,.,,)V

.444

.592

• 1+96

.770

.351

.461

.882

}, "'Z ')

~~

......-,,p,

..___

5

.3 1+1

.177

.039

.749

.597

.132

.770

.132

•

300
./ ,I

.667

C.
v

.341
_.. ,~--- -··--

.017

.001

.441+

.241

.162

.030

.162

.215

.542

7

• \..,-~ .r'

r,-·,c

.003

.001

.562

.460

.869

.043

.132

.292

.542

8

.c B2
1

.156

.085

.444

.365

.162

.030

.162

.218

.480

9

.341

.177

.0001

.249

.016

.869

.770

.869

.L~l5

.444

10

.003

.017

.039

.444

.197

.087

.077

.087

.155

.444

11

.341

.052

.117

,.440

.197

.132

.023

.132

.209

.444

12

.341

.069

.039

.749

.241

.204

.023

.132

.260

.542

13

.341

.177

.076

.562

.592

.132

.770

.869

.438

.426

14

.341

.177

.090

.444

.296

.162

.146

.162

.262

.542

15

.341

.177

.389

.444

.790

,351

.770

.204

.445

.542

-----··--p-k

w

--:i

Table 7

Observed Accuracy Ratios for n=l3 Female Subjects

TRIALS

1

2

1

.341

.052

.117

2

.341

.0001

3

.013

4

5

6

1.332

.197

.869

.023

.869

.610

1.778

.090

.444

.296

.204

.011

.052

.209

.441..j.

.o4o

.117

.444

.197

.263

.009

.1c7

• ...i..-. ..·.-,..

.341

.17?

.072

.I+44

.296

.132

.017

.132

•

5

.013

.05.:2

.001

.444

.592

.087

.030

.n37

.-·- ~,

6

.341

.1n

.3~39

.4Lt4

.592

.790

.030

.263

.~l:J

.667

7

.OCl

.032

.0:,7

.444

.213

.107

.017

.162

.

./

• 51+2

8

.341

.177

.117

.562

.296

.132

.011

.132

.2lt5

.444

9

.013

.040

.090

.444

.460

.162

.023

.204

.250

• s~~
c.c.

10

.341

.177

.058

.444

.592

.263

.770

.263

.471

1.33.?

11

.341

.177

.117

.749

.592

.204

.770

.087

.420

.749

12

.341

.177

.0001

.0001

.0001

.0001

.770

.0001

.192

.441+

13

.030

.o4o

.005

.015

.241

.132

.043

.204

.134

.500

Subject

3

4

7

~-- .

~

10

9

1 ?.i
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Discussion
This study was designed to investigate the concept
of conservatism in a Bayesian probability situation.

The

presence of conservatism was reflected by the accuracy ratio,
presently defined as a ratio between the log subjective odds
in favor of the occurrence of one specific event and the
corresponding Bayesian log odds in favor of the same event.
Evidence is offered to support the hypothesis that conservatism was present in a situation requiring Ss to make probability estimates with respect to the occurrence or nonoccurrence of two mutually exclusive events.
Secondly, this study investigated the possibility
that females would exhibit more conservatism than males in
this situation.

This hypothesis was not supported.

Bayes• theorem has been used as an appropriate normative model for experiments investigating the adequacy of subjective estimates (estimates made by people).

This type of

situation typically requires Ss to make probability estimates,
given certain relevant information, about the occurrence of
two or more independent events.

These estimates are then

compared with estimates calculated by Bayes' theorem for a
measure of how adequately the Ss are utilizing the available
information.
A consistent result of these studies has been that
subjects fail to approximate the normative model prescribing
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their behavior.

This phenomena, conservatism, has been

offered as evidence that

11

•••

men are suboptimal pro-

cessors of probability information" (Hays, 1963, p. 263).
It has been suggested that subjects are unable to process
all the information relevant to the situation and that they
are inconsistent in their use of the information they are
able to use.

This may be one limitation on human behavior.

The controversy with respect to the Bayesian movement
does not center around the statistical use of Bayes' theorem.
Since Bayes• theorem is a direct consequence of conditional
probability theory, it is not controversial with respect to
its use in calculating the appropriate conditional probabilities in the above described situation.

Instead, the

present controversy is primarily directed towards the use of
Bayes' theorem as a normative model prescribing how people
should behave.

It can be concluded that men are "suboptimal"

processors of information with respect to Bayes• theorem
only if Bayes• theorem is the appropriate model for prescribing

11

optimal 11 behavior.

That this is the case has not

been adequately demonstrated.
One difference between subjective and Bayesian estimates
is that estimates derived from Bayes' theorem are required
to obey the additivity principle, or sum to unity.
requirement is required of subjective estimates.

No such
To the

contrary, evidence is available to suggest that subjective
estimates do not obey this principle.
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Holmberg (1964) has conducted an experiment to investigate the additivity of subjective estimates.

He found

that the Ss estimates significantly failed to sum to unity.
Those estimates which obeyed the additivity principle were
primarily reflected in terms of "round" numbers (50:50,
60:40, 70:30, etc.).

From these results he concluded that

when unity was attained it was not on the basis of accurately
estimating the separate probabilities.

It was primarily

attributable to a bias of estimates towards 50 per cent, or
possibly convenience.
The present experiment, therefore, required the Ss
estimates on any given presentation of cues to sum to unity;
which was 100 in this study.
this manipulation placed a

11

Although it is possible that
psychological" restraint on the

subjects• estimates, the present investigator felt that this
control was necessary in order to insure that subjective
estimates obeyed the same principles as Bayesian estimates.
Since no indication was given by the Ss that they were
aware they were only making one estimate, it is possible
that this control failed to hamper or restrain their performance.
A second difference between subjective and Bayesian
estimates is the distinction between psychological and
mathematical probabilities.

The information utilized by

Bayes• theorem and that utilized by subjects are obviously
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different in nature.

Bayes• theorem functions completely

within the boundaries established by the separate prior
probabilities of the alternatives under consideration and
the cue proportions and sampled frequencies available.
Such probabilities are "immune" to all other extraneous
experimental variable.
Subjective estimates, however, are possibly reflective of more than these factors.

Other variables influenc-

ing the performance of the subjects are his preferences for
shapes, sizes, and colors.

For example, in the present

study three subjects expressed on the questionnaire filled
out following the testing session that they had personal
preferences for squares.

One female subject reported,

11

I

liked squares better than triangles although I often felt
I was wrong."

Another subject reported, "I determined my

estimates by the number of squares and triangles drawn,
but I had a bias towards squares for some unexplainable
reason. 11

These statements are suggestive that the geome-

tric cues in this study had

11

meaning 11 to the subjects

independent of the cue sampling on each trial.
Other variables which may affect subjective estimates
are the time of day that the experiment is conducted, the
nature of the specific task being performed, and the individual's previous attitudes and values.

Out of the 30 subjects

used for the analysis of variance of this study, 5 female
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and 10 male subjects expressed that they found the task
interesting; however, only one male subject found the task
uninteresting, while 4 female subjects expressed this
attitude.

Nine female subjects and 12 male subjects stated

that they found it challenging, while only 2 females and 1
male expressed that it was boring.

These results indicate

that definite attitudes towards the experimental task were
operative in the situation.

These attitudes were possibly

reflected in the subjects estimates.

If the Bayesians

insist that probability estimates are reflective of the
persons making them, then the above factors must be considered in this type of situation.

Since probabilities

calculated from Bayes• theorem are not reflective of such
factors, it is questionable if Bayes• theorem is the appropriate model for prescribing human behavior.
Stilson (1966, p. 79) points out that a second question related to the present controversy is the measurement
of subjective estimates.

He suggests that "The determina-

tion of subjective probabilities is a problem in psychological measurement."

He further suggests that an adequate

measure of subjective probabilities will require more precise measurement of the variables affecting them.

The

appropriate method of measurement and the identification
of the variables to be measured are problems which can only
be answered by further research.

44
In summary, it has been assumed in the past that because Bayes• theorem is derived from conditional probability
theory, it is the appropriate or adequate normative model
for prescribing behavior in a conditional probability situation.

Two suggestions are presented by the present author.

First, it is accepted that Bayes• theorem is the appropriate
mathematical model for calculating the conditional probabilities in Bayesian probability situations, but it cannot
be assumed nor has it been demonstrated th.at it is the
appropriate normative model prescribing how people should
behave in these situations.
Secondly, it is suggested that psychologists should
possibly concern themselves more with the identification and
measurement of the variables which affect subjective estimates.

One such variable, the sex of the subject performing

the task, was investigated in the present study.

Another

important variable would be utility, or how important it
was to the subject to be correct in his choice.

It seems

likely that both the personality and the preferences of the
subject are operative in a non-payoff situation as well as
a situation offering monetary rewards.

With the proper

identification of these variables, it may then be possible
to derive a model which would combine them in a manner that
would more adequately prescribe human behavior.

The possi-

bility of such a model primarily depends on" • • • our
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ability to observe the right things in the right ways under
the right circumstances" (Hays, 1963, p. 46).
The present experiment failed to offer evidence that
the results of the Kogan and Wallach research would be
operative in this situation.

A number of possible explana-

tions may account for these results.

In their study the

subjects physically manipulated the apparatus or were
allowed to interrupt the testing session when they had
reached a decision.

No such procedures were operative in

the present study.

The Kogan et al. results therefore may

be primarily due to the

11

physical 11 manipulation of the test-

ing procedure by the subjects.

The absence of the opportunity

for this type of involvement in the present study may have
affected the approaches adopted by the subjects in such a
manner as to eliminate the differences in conservatism that
Kogan and his colleagues found between male and female subjects.

Further research is needed to investigate the possi-

bility that the degree to which the subject is allowed to
participate in the experimental session markedly affects
the amount of conservatism present.
Kogan and Wallach also found that females were more
conservative in a payoff situation.

These results were not

evident in the present non-payoff experiment.

It is suggested,

therefore, that payoffs may not only be necessary to enhance
the subject's potential in making probability estimates, but
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that the effects of payoffs are not the same for both sexes.
Further research should concentrate not only on the types of
reinforcement and the amounts necessary to maximize human
judgment, but should investigate the relationship between
the subject 1 s sex and reinforcement.
In the Kogan and Wallach study it was reported that
female subjects tended to adopt more extreme but less risky
strategies than male subjects.

The present study does offer

some evidence in support of this conclusion.

The term

"strategy" is presently used the same as in game theory and
is defined as" • • • the selection of a probability distribution over events and the subsequent use of this distribution at each trial in a series to determine the particular
succession of choices to be made."

(Siegel, Siegel &

Andrews, 1964, p. 6).
The male subjects in the present study adopted more
risky strategies in approaching a solution to the problem
than the female subjects.

One male reported, "If the

figures were equal I estimated 50:50.

Each time the cues

were unequal I added 5 per cent for each figure with the
greatest frequency."

A second male subject reported that,

"The cue with the lowest frequency in the box used on the
previous trial would, by law of average, be less likely to
be drawn.

If this minority symbol approached 50 per cent on

the present trial, I would choose that box."

A third male
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reported,

11

I used a score method, dividing the boxes and

figures as teams and when they matched they gained points."
The strategies reported by the female subjects were
more extreme than those of the males.
11

One female reported,

It was the box with the most squares until I was proven

otherwise."

A second subject reported, "Usually I estimated

for the first 3 or 4 draws and then I decided on a guess."
A third female reported, "When 2 cues of the same kind were
drawn I thought it came from that box. 11
Of the 28 female subjects in the present experiment,
four expressed that their estimates were based on guessing.
None of the male subjects reported adopting this approach.
Six of the female subjects and 9 of the male subjects
stated that their estimates were determined by the frequency
of the cues drawn.

It is apparent, therefore, that females

may adopt a more extreme strategy than males.
A number of problems were evident in the methodology
of the present experiment.

The first is concerned with

biased cue sampling as a result of the nature of the figures
themselves.

Since a square occupies twice as much area as

a right triangle, the length of the legs of the triangle
being equal to the length of the sides of the square, the
box with the proportion of 600 squares and 400 triangles in
it actually contained an area ratio of 600 square inches to
200 square inches.

Even though there were 3 squares in the
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box for every 2 triangles, the squares actually occupy
three times as much area as the triangles.

In the box

with 600 triangles and 400 squares the area ratio was 300
square inches to 400 square inches in favor of the squares.
When sampling these figures from a wooden box with a pair
of eyebrow tweezers it seems plausible to assume that the
area inside the box occupied by each figure will influence
which figures are drawn out.

It could therefore be expected

that more squares than triangles would be sampled regardless
of which box was being used.

Table 3 presents a breakdown

of the cues actually sampled on each trial in the present
experiment.

It is evident from this table that more squares

were sampled on each of the 10 trials.
The present writer is therefore suggesting that the
lack of differences found between the amount of conservatism
exhibited between the male and female subjects of the
present experiment might be partially attributable to the
lack of ambiguity associated with the sampled cues.

It would

not be expected that the subjects would record high probability estimates for the box with the greater proportion of
triangles in it if twice as many squares had actually been
sampled.

An experimental situation where more ambiguity

was present with respect to the available alternatives might
result in the differences found between males and females
as in the Kogan and Wallach research.

Careful design of

the particular cues used would be an important factor in
future research.
Squares and right-triangles were used in the present
study to permit easy discrimination on the part of the subjects.

A second methodological problem evident in this study

was with the displaying of these cues.

Since each displayed

square occupied twice as much area on the screen as a displayed triangle, projected draws of 50:50 may not have been
perceived as such by the subjects.

Such a draw may appear

to contain more squares than triangles.

An example of this

situation in the present study was on trial 9.

Even though

the cues were sampled with equal frequency, the projection
area occupied by the squares was twice that of the triangles.
The possibility that this type of draw would be misrepresented to the subjects is reflected in the results that only

17 of the 43 subjects in this experiment recorded estimates
of 50:50 on this trial.

Research is therefore needed to

investigate the method of presentation of information to the
subjects in this type of situation.
In summary, the present experiment offers evidence to
support the conclusion th.at in a Bayesian probability situation, estimates made by the subjects would fail to be
equivalent to estimates computed by Bayes' theorem.

The

present author, however, is hesitant to accept these results
as evidence th.at human beings are "suboptimal" processors of

50
information.

Of the 430 estimates used to examine the

present results, thirteen were above the corresponding
Bayesian estimates.

If Bayesian estimates depict

11

optimal 11

behavior, then these thirteen estimates represent "optimalplus" behavior.

In other words, these estimates represent

behavior which is superior to optimal behavior.

This contra-

diction is therefore suggestive of further research to
investigate the adequacy of Bayes' theorem as a normative
model in this type of situation.
Secondly, this study failed to offer evidence that
females would be more conservative than males.

The present

data does depict that males were more conservative than
females on 7 of the 10 trials; however, these differences
failed to reach significance.
This study does offer evidence that males adopt more
risky but less extreme strategies in problem solving than
females.

Further research is needed to investigate the

specific types of strategies employed by males and females
and the effect that these strategies have on subjective
estimates.

Siegel, Siegel, and Andrews (1964) report that

men tend to adopt strategies which maximize utility, in
decision making situation; however, they stress that
11

•••

now research is needed to examine the generality of

the findings (of their research) for both sexes."
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INSTRUCTIONS
You have volunteered to perform tonight a task in a
psychological experiment.

We appreciate your interest in

our project and wish to thank all of you for donating your
time this evening to our efforts.
The two red boxes you see setting on the table in
the front of the room will be used.

Each box contains a

mixture of small cardboard geometric figures.

The chart

you see underneath the boxes summarizes the contents of
each box.

The box with the yellow square painted on it

contains 600 square figures and 400 right triangle figures.
The box with the yellow right triangle painted on it contains 600 right triangles and 400 squares.
For each trial we are going to draw 18 pairs of
figures out of one of the boxes.

As each pair is drawn out

we will ask you to report which box you think we are using
and to numerically record
using that box.

11

how sure" you are that we are

You will be told at the end of the "trial"

which box we are using.

There will be a total of 10 trials.

I will now summarize what has been said so far.

Each

time we draw a pair of figures out of the box you will be
asked to do two things.

First, you are to form opinions as

to which box you think we are using.

Your first opinion

will refer to the box with the 600 squares in it.

Your
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second opinion will refer to the box with the 600 triangles
in it.

Secondly, you are to assign a numerical estimate to

each opinion.

These estimates will indicate

are as to which box we are using.

11

how sure" you

Both your opinions and

how sure you are of them are to be recorded on the record
sheets provided.
The projection that is now on the screen in the front
of the room shows you what the record sheet looks like.

On

the left side of the sheet there are three lines with a
square above the top line.

On this side of the sheet you

will record how sure you are that we are using the box with
600 squares in it.

On the right side of the sheet are three

more lines with a right triangle above the top line.

On

these lines you will record how sure you are that we are
using the box with 600 right triangles in it.

The zero on

the left side of the lines means that there is no chance
that we could be using that box.

The 100 on the right side

of the lines means that you are absolutely sure that this
is the box we are using.

Anytime that you aren't able to

record a O or a 100, in other words, anytime you are not
absolutely sure as to which box we are using, you will
record "how sure" you are somewhere on the lines between
the O and the 100.

Where on the line for each box you

record "how sure" you are depends upon how strongly you
feel about your opinions concerning each box.

The only
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requirement is that each time we draw out a pair of figures,
the two numbers you record, one on each line, must sum or
add up to 100.
You will notice that between each pair of lines are
the numbers 1, 2, and 3.

This means that your first esti-

mates will be made on the pair of lines numbered one, your
second estimates (after we have drawn out the second pair of
figures) will be made on the pair of lines numbered two,
your third pair of estimates (after we have drawn out a
third pair of figures) will be made on the lines numbered
three.
I will now summarize what you are to do.
11

To begin a

trial 11 we will draw, from the box to be used on the trial,

one pair of figures.

At this time you will be asked to form

opinions and record "how sure" you are of them.
not be too sure as to which box we are using.

You might
However, it

is important that you make the best guess or estimates that
you can.

After you record your estimates we will draw out

two more figures and show these to you.
you to record two more estimates.

We will then ask

This procedure will be

followed for all 18 pairs of figures.
To record how sure you are of your opinions place a
mark on each of the lines and write in above each mark the
number that the mark stands for.

It is necessary that you

write the numbers above the marks since the lines are not
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marked off in equal units (10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, etc.).
A brief demonstration of the task will now be given.
Suppose that the first two figures drawn out of the
box are a square and a triangle.

You might feel that with

only this information given, one square and one triangle,
that the chances are equal that we could be using either
box.

Therefore, you might want to mark a 50 on each line.

Since there is already a mark in the middle of each line to
indicate where 50 is, it would be necessary only to write
in 50 above this mark on each of the lines.
50 + 50

=

earlier.

Notice that

100, which satisfies the requirement stated
After you have written in your numbers we would

proceed by drawing out two more figures.

Now with the informa-

tion of 4 figures to go by, you would record two more estimates on the lines with the 2 between them.

This would be

done the same as for the first pair of figures, by placing
a mark on each of the lines and writing the number the mark
stands for above each mark.

The same procedure would be

followed for the third pair of figures.
The record sheet for the first trial follows this
page.

You may now turn this page.

Remember, even though

you may not be sure as to which box we are using, please
make the best estimates that you can.

After the 18th pair

of figures is drawn we will show you which box we are using.
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?

APPENDIX E
QUESTIONNAIRE
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QUESTIONNAIRE
It would be appreciated by the experimentors if you
would take a few minutes to fill out this brief questionnaire pertaining to tonight's task.

We are interested pri-

marily in what you thought of the task and what approach
you felt worked best for you.
1.

Did you find the task interesting?
your answer.)

(Briefly explain

2.

Did you feel that it was challenging?

3.

What was your particular approach to deciding which
box we were using?

4.

What phenomena do you think the experimenters are
studying? (Your opinion, please)

5.

Would you like to receive a classroom explanation as
to what we are studying and why this particular task
was employed?

(Explain)

